Self-deception raises complex questions about the nature of belief and the structure of the human mind. In this book, Alfred Mele addresses four of the most critical of these questions: What is it to deceive oneself? How do we deceive ourselves? Why do we deceive ourselves? Is self-deception really possible? Drawing on cutting-edge empirical research on everyday reasoning and biases, Mele takes issue with commonplace attempts to equate the processes of self-deception with those of stereotypical interpersonal deception. Such attempts, he demonstrates, are fundamentally misguided, particularly in the assumption that self-deception is intentional. In their place, Mele proposes a compelling, empirically informed account of the motivational causes of biased beliefs. At the heart of this theory is an appreciation of how emotion and motivation may, without our knowing it, bias our assessment of evidence for beliefs. Highlighting motivation and emotion, Mele develops a pair of approaches for explaining the two forms of self-deception: the "straight" form, in which we believe what we want to be true, and the "twisted" form, in which we believe what we wish to be false. Underlying Mele's work is an abiding interest in understanding and explaining the behavior of real human beings. The result is a comprehensive, elegant, empirically grounded theory of everyday self-deception that should engage philosophers and social scientists alike.

Self-deception raises complex questions about the nature of belief and the structure of the human mind. In this book, Alfred Mele addresses four of the most critical of these questions: What is it to deceive oneself? How do we deceive ourselves? Why do we deceive ourselves? Is self-deception really possible? Drawing on cutting-edge empirical research on everyday reasoning and biases, Mele takes issue with commonplace attempts to equate the processes of self-deception with those of stereotypical interpersonal deception. Such attempts, he demonstrates, are fundamentally misguided, particularly in the assumption that self-deception is intentional. In their place, Mele proposes a compelling, empirically informed account of the motivational causes of biased beliefs. At the heart of this theory is an appreciation of how emotion and motivation may, without our knowing it, bias our assessment of evidence for beliefs. Highlighting motivation and emotion, Mele develops a pair of approaches for explaining the two forms of self-deception: the "straight" form, in which we believe what we want to be true, and the "twisted" form, in which we believe what we wish to be false. Underlying Mele's work is an abiding interest in understanding and explaining the behavior of real human beings. The result is a comprehensive, elegant, empirically grounded theory of everyday self-deception that should engage philosophers and social scientists alike.

El autoengaño pone de manifiesto algunas cuestiones complejas sobre la naturaleza de la creencia y la estructura de la mente humana. En este libro, Alfred Mele aborda cuatro de las cuestiones más críticas sobre este tema: ¿Qué es engañarse a uno mismo? ¿Cómo nos engañamos a nosotros mismos? ¿Por qué nos engañamos a nosotros mismos? ¿Es el autoengaño realmente posible?Haciendo uso de una vanguardista investigación empírica sobre razonamientos y predisposiciones cotidianas, Mele se muestra en desacuerdo con la corriente que trata de equiparar los procesos del autoengaño con los estereotipos del engaño interpersonal. Demuestra que estos intentos están fundamentalmente equivocados, sobre todo porque suponen que el autoengaño es intencionado. Por el contrario, Mele propone una explicación convincente, empíricamente documentada, de las causas que motivan la predisposición de las creencias. El punto central de esta teoría radica en la apreciación de cómo la emoción y la motivación pueden, sin nosotros saberlo, predisponer nuestra apreciación de las creencias. Al destacar la importancia de la motivación y de la emoción, Mele desarrolla dos enfoques que explican dos formas de autoengaño: la forma "directa", según la cual creemos que lo que queremos sea verdad, y la "retorcida", según la cual creemos que lo que deseamos sea falso.El objetivo de esta investigación es un respetuoso interés por entender y explicar el comportamiento de los seres humanos. El resultado es una exhaustiva, elaborada y empíricamente documentada teoría del autoengaño en la vida cotidiana, que implique tanto a los filósofos como a los científicos sociales.

El autoengaño pone de manifiesto algunas cuestiones complejas sobre la naturaleza de la creencia y la estructura de la mente humana. En este libro, Alfred Mele aborda cuatro de las cuestiones más críticas sobre este tema: ¿Qué es engañarse a uno mismo? ¿Cómo nos engañamos a nosotros mismos? ¿Por qué nos engañamos a nosotros mismos? ¿Es el autoengaño realmente posible?Haciendo uso de una vanguardista investigación empírica sobre razonamientos y predisposiciones cotidianas, Mele se muestra en desacuerdo con la corriente que trata de equiparar los procesos del autoengaño con los estereotipos del engaño interpersonal. Demuestra que estos intentos están fundamentalmente equivocados, sobre todo porque suponen que el autoengaño es intencionado. Por el contrario, Mele propone una explicación convincente, empíricamente documentada, de las causas que motivan la predisposición de las creencias. El punto central de esta teoría radica en la apreciación de cómo la emoción y la motivación pueden, sin nosotros saberlo, predisponer nuestra apreciación de las creencias. Al destacar la importancia de la motivación y de la emoción, Mele desarrolla dos enfoques que explican dos formas de autoengaño: la forma "directa", según la cual creemos que lo que queremos sea verdad, y la "retorcida", según la cual creemos que lo que deseamos sea falso.El objetivo de esta investigación es un respetuoso interés por entender y explicar el comportamiento de los seres humanos. El resultado es una exhaustiva, elaborada y empíricamente documentada teoría del autoengaño en la vida cotidiana, que implique tanto a los filósofos como a los científicos sociales.

El autoengaño pone de manifiesto algunas cuestiones complejas sobre la naturaleza de la creencia y la estructura de la mente humana. En este libro, Alfred Mele aborda cuatro de las cuestiones más críticas sobre este tema: ¿Qué es engañarse a uno mismo? ¿Cómo nos engañamos a nosotros mismos? ¿Por qué nos engañamos a nosotros mismos? ¿Es el autoengaño realmente posible?Haciendo uso de una vanguardista investigación empírica sobre razonamientos y predisposiciones cotidianas, Mele se muestra en desacuerdo con la corriente que trata de equiparar los procesos del autoengaño con los estereotipos del engaño interpersonal. Demuestra que estos intentos están fundamentalmente equivocados, sobre todo porque suponen que el autoengaño es intencionado. Por el contrario, Mele propone una explicación convincente, empíricamente documentada, de las causas que motivan la predisposición de las creencias. El punto central de esta teoría radica en la apreciación de cómo la emoción y la motivación pueden, sin nosotros saberlo, predisponer nuestra apreciación de las creencias. Al destacar la importancia de la motivación y de la emoción, Mele desarrolla dos enfoques que explican dos formas de autoengaño: la forma "directa", según la cual creemos que lo que queremos sea verdad, y la "retorcida", según la cual creemos que lo que deseamos sea falso.El objetivo de esta investigación es un respetuoso interés por entender y explicar el comportamiento de los seres humanos. El resultado es una exhaustiva, elaborada y empíricamente documentada teoría del autoengaño en la vida cotidiana, que implique tanto a los filósofos como a los científicos sociales.

Esiste il libero arbitrio? Secondo molti scienziati e filosofi, le nostre decisioni sono determinate nel cervello prima di affiorare alla coscienza, e per questo sfuggono al nostro controllo. Analogamente, secondo parecchi psicologi sociali, le situazioni in cui ci troviamo predeterminano in modo meccanico le nostre scelte. Ma la scienza ha davvero confutato il libero arbitrio? Secondo Alfred R. Mele – notissimo filosofo americano con grandi competenze di psicologia e neuroscienze –, in realtà, le prove scientifiche non sono affatto così univoche. In questo breve libro, che si rivolge soprattutto ai non specialisti, Mele spiega in maniera convincente perché non c’è ragione di pensare che il libero arbitrio sia soltanto un’illusione.

Free Will: An Opinionated Guide offers a clear and straightforward introduction to a vexing topic, from an internationally recognized authority on free will. What did you do a moment ago? What will you do after you read this? Are you deciding as we speak, or is something else going on in your brain or elsewhere in your body that is determining your actions? Stopping to think this way can freeze us in our tracks. A lot in the world feels far beyond our control--the last thing we need is to question whether we make our own choices in the way we usually assume we do. Questions about free will are so major and consequential that we may prefer not to think about them at all, lest we feel completely lost and unsure of everything we thought we knew! Free will is certainly important, but it does not need to be daunting. Free Will: An Opinionated Guide offers a clear and straightforward introduction to this vexing topic. Drawing on decades of extensive research in philosophy, neuroscience, and psychology, internationally recognized authority on free will Alfred R. Mele explains and explores the most prominent theories, puzzles, and arguments about free will, all the while presenting his own distinctive take on the topic. Mele's use of attention-grabbing thought experiments brings deep philosophical issues to life. He tackles the questions already on readers' minds and some they will encounter for the first time, on topics like determinism, neuroscience, and control. Whether this is the only book on free will you will read, or just the beginning of a deeper investigation, you will never think about free will, or the decisions you believe you're making, in the same ways again.

Self-deception raises complex questions about the nature of belief and the structure of the human mind. In this book, Alfred Mele addresses four of the most critical of these questions: What is it to deceive oneself? How do we deceive ourselves? Why do we deceive ourselves? Is self-deception really possible? Drawing on cutting-edge empirical research on everyday reasoning and biases, Mele takes issue with commonplace attempts to equate the processes of self-deception with those of stereotypical interpersonal deception. Such attempts, he demonstrates, are fundamentally misguided, particularly in the assumption that self-deception is intentional. In their place, Mele proposes a compelling, empirically informed account of the motivational causes of biased beliefs. At the heart of this theory is an appreciation of how emotion and motivation may, without our knowing it, bias our assessment of evidence for beliefs. Highlighting motivation and emotion, Mele develops a pair of approaches for explaining the two forms of self-deception: the "straight" form, in which we believe what we want to be true, and the "twisted" form, in which we believe what we wish to be false. Underlying Mele's work is an abiding interest in understanding and explaining the behavior of real human beings. The result is a comprehensive, elegant, empirically grounded theory of everyday self-deception that should engage philosophers and social scientists alike.

"Thought experiments featuring manipulated agents and designed agents have played a significant role in the literature on moral responsibility. What can we learn from thought experiments of this kind about the nature of moral responsibility? That is this book’s primary question. An important lesson lies at the core of its answer: Moral responsibility for actions has a historical dimension of a certain kind. A pair of agents whose current nonhistorical properties are very similar and who perform deeds of the same kind may nevertheless be such that one is morally responsible for the deed whereas the other is not, and what makes the difference is a difference in how they came to be as they are at that time—that is, a historical difference. Imagine that each of these agents attempts to assassinate someone. Depending on the details of the cases, it may be that one of these agents is morally responsible for the attempt whereas the other is not, because one of them was manipulated in a certain way into being in the psychological state that issues in the behavior whereas the other agent came to be in that state under his own steam. A variety of thought experiments are considered. They include stories about agents whose value systems are radically altered by manipulators, vignettes featuring agents who are built from scratch, and scenarios in which agents magically come into being with full psychological profiles." -- Oxford Scholarship Online

Self-deception raises complex questions about the nature of belief and the structure of the human mind. In this book, Alfred Mele addresses four of the most critical of these questions: What is it to deceive oneself? How do we deceive ourselves? Why do we deceive ourselves? Is self-deception really possible? Drawing on empirical research on everyday reasoning and biases, Mele takes issue with commonplace attempts to equate the processes of self-deception with those of stereotypical interpersonal deception. Such attempts, he demonstrates, are fundamentally misguided, particularly in the assumption that self-deception is intentional. In their place, Mele proposes an account of the motivational causes of biased beliefs. At the heart of this theory is an appreciation of how emotion and motivation may, without our knowing it, bias our assessment of evidence for beliefs. Highlighting motivation and emotion, Mele develops a pair of approaches for explaining the two forms of self-deception: the "straight" form, in which we believe what we want to be true, and the "twisted" form, in which we believe what we wish to be false. --From publisher's description. Read more... Abstract: Self-deception raises questions about the nature of belief and the structure of the human mind. This book takes the issue with commonplace attempts to equate the processes of self-deception with those of stereotypical interpersonal deception. Read more...

Self-deception raises complex questions about the nature of belief and the structure of the human mind. In this book, Alfred Mele addresses four of the most critical of these questions: What is it to deceive oneself? How do we deceive ourselves? Why do we deceive ourselves? Is self-deception really possible?Drawing on cutting-edge empirical research on everyday reasoning and biases, Mele takes issue with commonplace attempts to equate the processes of self-deception with those of stereotypical interpersonal deception. Such attempts, he demonstrates, are fundamentally misguided, particularly in the assumption that self-deception is intentional. In their place, Mele proposes a compelling, empirically informed account of the motivational causes of biased beliefs. At the heart of this theory is an appreciation of how emotion and motivation may, without our knowing it, bias our assessment of evidence for beliefs. Highlighting motivation and emotion, Mele develops a pair of approaches for explaining the two forms of self-deception: the "straight" form, in which we believe what we want to be true, and the "twisted" form, in which we believe what we wish to be false.Underlying Mele's work is an abiding interest in understanding and explaining the behavior of real human beings. The result is a comprehensive, elegant, empirically grounded theory of everyday self-deception that should engage philosophers and social scientists alike.words : 46983

Self-control has gained enormous attention in recent years both in philosophy and the mind sciences, for it has profound implications on so many aspects of human life. Overcoming temptation, improving cognitive functioning, making life-altering decisions, and numerous other challenges all depend upon self-control. But recent developments in the philosophy of mind and in action theory, as well as in psychology, are now testing some of the assumptions about the nature of self-control previously held on purely a priori grounds. New essays in this volume offer fresh insights from a variety of angles: neuroscience; social, cognitive, and developmental psychology; decision theory; and philosophy. While much of the literature on self-control is spread across distinct disciplines and journals, this volume presents for the first time a thorough and truly interdisciplinary exploration of the topic. The essays address four central topics: what self-control is and how it works; temptation and goal pursuit; self-control, morality, and law; and extending self-control. They take up an array of complex and important questions. What is self-control? How is self-control related to willpower? How does inhibitory control work? What are the cultural and developmental origins of beliefs about self-control? How are attempts at self-control hindered or helped by emotions? How do our beliefs about our own ability to deal with temptation influence our behavior? What does the ability to avoid temptation depend on? How should juvenile responsibility be understood, and how should the juvenile justice system be reformed? Can an account of self-control help us understand free will? Combining the most recent scientific research with new frontiers in the philosophy of mind, this volume offers the most definitive guide to self-control to date.

Contents 8 Preface 10 Chapter 1. Introduction: Approaches, Puzzles, Biases, and Agency 16 Chapter 2. Garden-Variety Straight Self-Deception: Some Psychological Processes 38 Chapter 3. Self-Deception without Puzzles 63 Chapter 4. Attempted Empirical Demonstrations of Strict Self-Deception 89 Chapter 5. Twisted Self-Deception 107 Chapter 6. Conclusion 132 Notes 138 References 150 Index 158 A 158 B 158 C 158 D 158 E 159 F 159 G 159 H 159 I 159 J 159 K 159 L 159 M 159 N 159 O 160 P 160 Q 160 R 160 S 160 T 160 U 161 V 161 W 161

What bearing do our histories--our influences, what we have done and what has happened to us--have on our responsibility for the actions we take or consider in the present? This is the question at the center of Alfred R. Mele's examination of moral responsibility, including the moral responsibility of manipulated agents. Departing from other scholars writing on free will and moral responsibility, Mele reflects on a wide range of thought experiments that feature agents who have been manipulated or designed in ways which directly affect their actions. Although such thought experiments are often used by philosophers to illustrate significant features of moral responsibility, little attention has been paid to ways in which various details make a difference. In Manipulated Agents , Mele addresses this gap, arguing that such vignettes have the potential to unlock an understanding of moral responsibility that takes an agent's history into account when assigning moral praise or blame. In his analysis of these thought experiments, Mele presents a highly accessible, compelling defense of a "history-sensitive" conception of moral responsibility that has implications for free will. Review "All of Alfred Mele's philosophical virtues are on display in this book. It is packed with creative examples, rigorous argumentation, detailed engagement with alternative views, and that rarely-sighted thing: a plausible philosophical view that still teaches us something. Manipulated Agents is a state-of-the-art account of history-sensitive compatibilism and how it can address the many puzzles surrounding manipulation." --Manuel Vargas, Professor of Phi losophy, University of California at San Diego "In his engaging, luminous, and meticulous fashion, Mele draws on radical reversal manipulation cases, featuring extreme changes in a person's values, to defend an externalist constraint on moral responsibility. Characteristically, Mele displays intellectual integrity, keen metaphysical insight, and categorical commitment to getting it right." --Ishtiyaque Haji, Professor of Philosophy, University of Calgary Alfred Mele's Manipulated Agents is devoted solely to understanding what can be learned about moral responsibility by attending to cases of manipulated agents who, by various means, are manipulated into acquiring beliefs, desires, intentions, values, or principles. This brief, carefully-argued book is a joy to read. It will be easily accessible to those not steeped in the literature on free will and moral responsibility, but it will also pay off handsomely for those who have been working on these topics for years. While carefully examining a range of positions one might take, Mele himself defends a version of a historical theory according to which a person is a morally responsible agent only if her history does not include certain objectionable forms of manipulation." --Michael McKenna, Professor of Philosophy, University of Arizona About the Author Alfred R. Mele is the William H. and Lucyle T. Werkmeister Professor of Philosophy at Florida State University. He is the author of ten previous OUP books and over 200 articles and an editor of six OUP books. He is past director of two multi-million dollar, interdisciplinary projects: the Big Questions in Free Will project (2010-13) and the Philosophy and Science of Self-Control project (2014-17).

Libertarianism about free will is the conjunction of a negative thesis and a positive thesis. The negative thesis is that free will is incompatible with determinism. The positive thesis is that there are actions that are or involve exercises of free will—__free actions__, for short. While remaining neutral of the negative thesis, this book develops a detailed version of the positive thesis that represents paradigmatically free actions as indeterministically caused by their proximal causes and pays special attention to decisions caused in this way. The bulk of the book is a defense of this thesis against popular objections to theses of its kind. This defense includes solutions to problems about luck and control that are widely discussed in the literature on free will and moral responsibility. Various key concepts are clarified, including complete control, direct control, and its being up to an agent what is decided; and it is argued that free will may be accommodated without invoking agent-causation. The seven chapters on free will are preceded by an introductory chapter and three chapters on central issues in the philosophy of action that bear on standard treatments of free will—deciding to act, agents’ abilities, and commitments of a causal theory of action explanation.

Rationality has long been a central topic in philosophy, crossing standard divisions and categories. It continues to attract much attention in published research and teaching by philosophers as well as scholars in other disciplines, including economics, psychology, and law. The Oxford Handbook of Rationality is an indispensable reference to the current state of play in this vital and interdisciplinary area of study. Twenty-two newly commissioned chapters by a roster of distinguished philosophers provide an overview of the prominent views on rationality, with each author also developing a unique and distinctive argument.

Rationality has long been a central topic in philosophy, crossing standard divisions and categories. It continues to attract much attention in published research and teaching by philosophers as well as scholars in other disciplines, including economics, psychology, and law. The Oxford Handbook of Rationality is an indispensable reference to the current state of play in this vital and interdisciplinary area of study. Twenty-two newly commissioned chapters by a roster of distinguished philosophers provide an overview of the prominent views on rationality, with each author also developing a unique and distinctive argument.ISBN : 9780195145397

For over thirty years, Robert Audi has produced important work in ethics, epistemology, and the theory of action. This volume features thirteen new critical essays on Audi by a distinguished group of authors: Fred Adams, William Alston, Laurence BonJour, Roger Crisp, Elizabeth Fricker, Bernard Gert, Thomas Hurka, Hugh McCann, Al Mele, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, Raimo Tuomela, Candace Vogler, and Timothy Williamson. Audi's introductory essay provides a thematic overview interconnecting his views in ethics, epistemology, and philosophy of action. The volume concludes with his comprehensive response essay that yields an illuminating dialog with all his critics and often extends his previous work. Review "Mark Timmons, John Greco, and Alfred R. Mele have put together an excellent collection of essays on the work of Robert Audi.... It ranges over a broad set of topics and contains much high quality philosophical work from a distinguished set of contributors."--Scott Sehon, Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews About the Author Mark Timmons is at Arizona State University. John Greco is at Fordham University. Alfred Mele is at Florida State University.

"Does free will exist? The question has fueled heated debates spanning from philosophy to psychology and religion. The answer has major implications, and the stakes are high. To put it in the simple terms that have come to dominate these debates, if we are free to make our own decisions, we are accountable for what we do, and if we aren't free, we're off the hook. There are neuroscientists who claim that our decisions are made unconsciously and are therefore outside of our control and social psychologists who argue that myriad imperceptible factors influence even our minor decisions to the extent that there is no room for free will. According to philosopher Alfred R. Mele, what they point to as hard and fast evidence that free will cannot exist actually leaves much room for doubt. If we look more closely at the major experiments that free will deniers cite, we can see large gaps where the light of possibility shines through. In Free: Why Science Hasn't Disproved Free Will, Mele lays out his opponents' experiments simply and clearly, and proceeds to debunk their supposed findings, one by one, explaining how the experiments don't provide the solid evidence for which they have been touted. There is powerful evidence that conscious decisions play an important role in our lives, and knowledge about situational influences can allow people to respond to those influences rationally rather than with blind obedience. Mele also explores the meaning and ramifications of free will. What, exactly, does it mean to have free will -- is it a state of our soul, or an undefinable openness to alternative decisions? Is it something natural and practical that is closely tied to moral responsibility? Since evidence suggests that denying the existence of free will actually encourages bad behavior, we have a duty to give it a fair chance"-- "Scientists have forged a penetrating, coherent course in the study of human thought and action. Yet some of the same scientists have slashed out an adjacent, rough-hewn path, cutting at the roots of the belief in free will and at the groundwork of relationships among the conscious will, the mind, and the brain. Claiming to disprove the existence of free will is not only wrongheaded, Mele argues, but harmful; research shows that people who don't believe they are free are more likely to behave badly, as they sink into feeling like they aren't responsible for their actions. Putting a positive spin on this, Mele conveys what he calls the 'good news' that we are freer than we think. If we see ourselves as morally responsible for our future actions, we can begin to view ourselves as having abilities and capacities that give us considerable control over what we do. Mele takes apart the findings of neuroscience and psychology experiments often cited as irrefutably disproving the existence of free will, for example those of Benjamin Libet, and demonstrates that their results have been misinterpreted. Mele explains why the experimental findings are actually consistent with our making many of our decisions consciously and with our having considerable control over many of our decisions and actions. In order to find truth and clarity on this crucial topic, Mele argues, philosophers, scientists, and psychologists alike need to explore one another's work rather than relying on scientific findings - and a rigid interpretation of those findings- as the only key to solving the complex puzzle that is free will"-- Read more... Abstract: "Does free will exist? The question has fueled heated debates spanning from philosophy to psychology and religion. The answer has major implications, and the stakes are high. To put it in the simple terms that have come to dominate these debates, if we are free to make our own decisions, we are accountable for what we do, and if we aren't free, we're off the hook. There are neuroscientists who claim that our decisions are made unconsciously and are therefore outside of our control and social psychologists who argue that myriad imperceptible factors influence even our minor decisions to the extent that there is no room for free will. According to philosopher Alfred R. Mele, what they point to as hard and fast evidence that free will cannot exist actually leaves much room for doubt. If we look more closely at the major experiments that free will deniers cite, we can see large gaps where the light of possibility shines through. In Free: Why Science Hasn't Disproved Free Will, Mele lays out his opponents' experiments simply and clearly, and proceeds to debunk their supposed findings, one by one, explaining how the experiments don't provide the solid evidence for which they have been touted. There is powerful evidence that conscious decisions play an important role in our lives, and knowledge about situational influences can allow people to respond to those influences rationally rather than with blind obedience. Mele also explores the meaning and ramifications of free will. What, exactly, does it mean to have free will -- is it a state of our soul, or an undefinable openness to alternative decisions? Is it something natural and practical that is closely tied to moral responsibility? Since evidence suggests that denying the existence of free will actually encourages bad behavior, we have a duty to give it a fair chance"-- "Scientists have forged a penetrating, coherent course in the study of human thought and action. Yet some of the same scientists have slashed out an adjacent, rough-hewn path, cutting at the roots of the belief in free will and at the groundwork of relationships among the conscious will, the mind, and the brain. Claiming to disprove the existence of free will is not only wrongheaded, Mele argues, but harmful; research shows that people who don't believe they are free are more likely to behave badly, as they sink into feeling like they aren't responsible for their actions. Putting a positive spin on this, Mele conveys what he calls the 'good news' that we are freer than we think. If we see ourselves as morally responsible for our future actions, we can begin to view ourselves as having abilities and capacities that give us considerable control over what we do. Mele takes apart the findings of neuroscience and psychology experiments often cited as irrefutably disproving the existence of free will, for example those of Benjamin Libet, and demonstrates that their results have been misinterpreted. Mele explains why the experimental findings are actually consistent with our making many of our decisions consciously and with our having considerable control over many of our decisions and actions. In order to find truth and clarity on this crucial topic, Mele argues, philosophers, scientists, and psychologists alike need to explore one another's work rather than relying on scientific findings - and a rigid interpretation of those findings- as the only key to solving the complex puzzle that is free will"

Free Will: An Opinionated Guide offers a clear and straightforward introduction to a vexing topic, from an internationally recognized authority on free will. What did you do a moment ago? What will you do after you read this? Are you deciding as we speak, or is something else going on in your brain or elsewhere in your body that is determining your actions? Stopping to think this way can freeze us in our tracks. A lot in the world feels far beyond our control—the last thing we need is to question whether we make our own choices in the way we usually assume we do. Questions about free will are so major and consequential that we may prefer not to think about them at all, lest we feel completely lost and unsure of everything we thought we knew! Free will is certainly important, but it does not need to be daunting. Free Will: An Opinionated Guide offers a clear and straightforward introduction to this vexing topic. Drawing on decades of extensive research in philosophy, neuroscience, and psychology, internationally recognized authority on free will Alfred R. Mele explains and explores the most prominent theories, puzzles, and arguments about free will, all the while presenting his own distinctive take on the topic. Mele's use of attention-grabbing thought experiments brings deep philosophical issues to life. He tackles the questions already on readers' minds and some they will encounter for the first time, on topics like determinism, neuroscience, and control. Whether this is the only book on free will you will read, or just the beginning of a deeper investigation, you will never think about free will, or the decisions you believe you're making, in the same ways again.

This chapter sketches a view about how paradigmatic weak-willed actions are produced that it contrasts with competing views, including some ancient views. Along the way, it explores the entanglement of weakness of will with such issues as how our intentional actions are to be explained, the power of practical reasoning and practical evaluative judgments, the nature of intentions, the motivational strength of desires, decision-making, self-control, and free will. Also discussed are scientific work on the motivational significance of different ways of representing the objects of our desires and of increased subjective proximity of potential desire satisfaction and the relationship between weakness of will and akrasia.

This chapter performs two main tasks. First, it sets the stage for an answer to the question of how we can determine whether or not we have free will by articulating two competing proposals about what would suffice for freely making a decision to do something. Second, it identifies what we would have to learn in order to know that the conditions set out in those proposals are satisfied and what we would have to learn in order to know that these conditions are not satisfied. Both proposals appeal to consciousness, reasonableness, being well-informed, and the absence of undue pressure. They differ in that one of the proposals can be satisfied even if determinism is true, but the other one cannot.

People backslide.They freely do things they believe it would be best on the whole not to do -- a judgment developed from their own point of view, not just the perspective of their peers or their parents. The aim of this book is to to clarify the nature of backsliding - of actions that display some weakness of will -- using traditional philosophical techniques that date back to Plato and Aristotle (whose work on weakness of will or "akrasia" he discusses) and some new studies in the emerging field of experimental philosophy. Mele then attacks the thesis that backsliding is an illusion because people never freely act contrarily to what they judge is best. He argues that it is extremely plausible that if people ever act freely, they sometimes backslide. At the book's heart is the development of a theoretical and empirical framework that sheds light both on backsliding and on exercises of self-control that prevent it. Here, Mele draws on work in social and developmental psychology and in psychiatry to motivate a view of human behavior in which both backsliding and overcoming the temptation to backslide are explicable. He argues that backsliding is no illusion and our theories about the springs of action, the power of evaluative judgments, human agency, human rationality, practical reasoning, and motivation should accommodate backsliding.

Self-deception raises complex questions about the nature of belief and the structure of the human mind. In this book, Alfred Mele addresses four of the most critical of these questions: What is it to deceive oneself? How do we deceive ourselves? Why do we deceive ourselves? Is self-deception really possible? Drawing on cutting-edge empirical research on everyday reasoning and biases, Mele takes issue with commonplace attempts to equate the processes of self-deception with those of stereotypical interpersonal deception. Such attempts, he demonstrates, are fundamentally misguided, particularly in the assumption that self-deception is intentional. In their place, Mele proposes a compelling, empirically informed account of the motivational causes of biased beliefs. At the heart of this theory is an appreciation of how emotion and motivation may, without our knowing it, bias our assessment of evidence for beliefs. Highlighting motivation and emotion, Mele develops a pair of approaches for explaining the two forms of self-deception: the "straight" form, in which we believe what we want to be true, and the "twisted" form, in which we believe what we wish to be false. Underlying Mele's work is an abiding interest in understanding and explaining the behavior of real human beings. The result is a comprehensive, elegant, empirically grounded theory of everyday self-deception that should engage philosophers and social scientists alike.