Manipulated Agents : A Window to Moral Responsibility 🔍
Alfred R. Mele Oxford University Press, Incorporated, 1, 2019
英语 [en] · PDF · 5.8MB · 2019 · 📘 非小说类图书 · 🚀/lgli/lgrs/nexusstc/zlib · Save
描述
"Thought experiments featuring manipulated agents and designed agents have played a significant role in the literature on moral responsibility. What can we learn from thought experiments of this kind about the nature of moral responsibility? That is this book’s primary question. An important lesson lies at the core of its answer: Moral responsibility for actions has a historical dimension of a certain kind. A pair of agents whose current nonhistorical properties are very similar and who perform deeds of the same kind may nevertheless be such that one is morally responsible for the deed whereas the other is not, and what makes the difference is a difference in how they came to be as they are at that time—that is, a historical difference. Imagine that each of these agents attempts to assassinate someone. Depending on the details of the cases, it may be that one of these agents is morally responsible for the attempt whereas the other is not, because one of them was manipulated in a certain way into being in the psychological state that issues in the behavior whereas the other agent came to be in that state under his own steam. A variety of thought experiments are considered. They include stories about agents whose value systems are radically altered by manipulators, vignettes featuring agents who are built from scratch, and scenarios in which agents magically come into being with full psychological profiles." -- Oxford Scholarship Online
备用文件名
lgli/Manipulated Agents - Mele, Alfred R.;.pdf
备用文件名
lgrsnf/Manipulated Agents - Mele, Alfred R.;.pdf
备用文件名
zlib/Society, Politics & Philosophy/Anthropology/Alfred R. Mele/Manipulated Agents: A Window To Moral Responsibility_5280344.pdf
备选作者
Mele, Alfred R.
备用出版商
IRL Press at Oxford University Press
备用出版商
Oxford Institute for Energy Studies
备用出版商
German Historical Institute London
备用版本
Oxford University Press USA, New York, NY, 2019
备用版本
United Kingdom and Ireland, United Kingdom
备用版本
Illustrated, 2019-04-01
备用版本
Illustrated, PT, 2019
元数据中的注释
0
元数据中的注释
lg2433744
元数据中的注释
{"edition":"1","isbns":["0190927968","0190927992","9780190927967","9780190927998"],"last_page":174,"publisher":"Oxford University Press"}
备用描述
"Common sense tells us that all people who perform intentional actions are influenced by things they have done and things that have happened to them. If someone is a superb deliberator or remarkably courageous, we might like to know how he came to be that way, if only because that knowledge about his past might suggest measures we might take to make ourselves better deliberators or more courageous. To what extent does an agent's history help us figure out whether or not he is responsible for an action in question? What period of time do we need to look at to grasp all the factors that will influence the person in question's action or choice? In answering questions such as this in the literature on moral responsibility and free will, philosophers often make heavy use of thought experiments to make their points. These experiments feature manipulated agents -- agents who are clearly influenced by certain forces or conditions, and therefore not entirely free. What can we learn from vignettes of this kind about the nature of moral responsibility for actions? Mele seeks to answer this very consequential, if specific question in this book. Small though this question may seem, answering it can unlock a full-blown understanding of moral responsibility, as Mele shows here" -- Provided by publisher
备用描述
"Common sense tells us that all people who perform intentional actions are influenced by things they have done and things that have happened to them. If someone is a superb deliberator or remarkably courageous, we might like to know how he came to be that way, if only because that knowledge about his past might suggest measures we might take to make ourselves better deliberators or more courageous. To what extent does an agent's history help us figure out whether or not he is responsible for an action in question? What period of time do we need to look at to grasp all the factors that will influence the person in question's action or choice? In answering questions such as this in the literature on moral responsibility and free will, philosophers often make heavy use of thought experiments to make their points. These experiments feature manipulated agents -- agents who are clearly influenced by certain forces or conditions, and therefore not entirely free. What can we learn from vignettes of this kind about the nature of moral responsibility for actions? Mele seeks to answer this very consequential, if specific question in this book. Small though this question may seem, answering it can unlock a full-blown understanding of moral responsibility, as Mele shows here"-- Résumé de l'éditeur
备用描述
What bearing do our histories--our influences, what we have done and what has happened to us--have on our responsibility for the actions we take or consider in the present? This is the question at the center of Alfred R. Mele's examination of moral responsibility, including the moral responsibility of manipulated agents.
Departing from other scholars writing on free will and moral responsibility, Mele reflects on a wide range of thought experiments that feature agents who have been manipulated or designed in ways which directly affect their actions. Although such thought experiments are often used by philosophers to illustrate significant features of moral responsibility, little attention has been paid to ways in which various details make a difference. In Manipulated Agents , Mele addresses this gap, arguing that such vignettes have the potential to unlock an understanding of moral responsibility that takes an agent's history into account when assigning moral praise or blame. In his analysis of these thought experiments, Mele presents a highly accessible, compelling defense of a "history-sensitive" conception of moral responsibility that has implications for free will.
备用描述
Introduction --
Internalism and externalism --
Instant agents, minutelings, and radical reversals --
Must compatibilists be internalists? --
Bullet biting and beyond --
Wrapping things up.
开源日期
2019-11-02
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