Each of the following claims has been defended in the scientific literature on free will and consciousness: your brain routinely decides what you will do before you become conscious of its decision; there is only a 100 millisecond window of opportunity for free will, and all it can do is veto conscious decisions, intentions, or urges; intentions never play a role in producing corresponding actions; and free will is an illusion. In Effective Intentions Alfred Mele shows that the evidence offered to support these claims is sorely deficient. He also shows that there is strong empirical support for the thesis that some conscious decisions and intentions have a genuine place in causal explanations of corresponding actions. In short, there is weighty evidence of the existence of effective conscious intentions or the power of conscious will. Mele examines the accuracy of subjects'reports about when they first became aware of decisions or intentions in laboratory settings and develops some implications of warranted skepticism about the accuracy of these reports. In addition, he explores such questions as whether we must be conscious of all of our intentions and why scientists disagree about this. Mele's final chapter closes with a discussion of imaginary scientific findings that would warrant bold claims about free will and consciousness of the sort he examines in this book.

Mele, Alfred R., 1951-

IRL Press at Oxford University Press

Oxford Institute for Energy Studies

German Historical Institute London

United Kingdom and Ireland, United Kingdom

Oxford, New York, England, 2009

1, US, 2009

Each of the following claims has been defended in the scientific literature on free will and your brain routinely decides what you will do before you become conscious of its decision; there is only a 100 millisecond window of opportunity for free will, and all it can do is veto conscious decisions, intentions, or urges; intentions never play a role in producing corresponding actions; and free will is an illusion.
In Effective Intentions Alfred Mele shows that the evidence offered to support these claims is sorely deficient. He also shows that there is strong empirical support for the thesis that some conscious decisions and intentions have a genuine place in causal explanations of corresponding actions. In short, there is weighty evidence of the existence of effective conscious intentions or the power of conscious will. Mele examines the accuracy of subjects' reports about when they first became aware of decisions or intentions in laboratory settings and develops some implications of warranted skepticism about the accuracy of these reports. In addition, he explores such questions as whether we must be conscious of all of our intentions and why scientists disagree about this. Mele's final chapter closes with a discussion of imaginary scientific findings that would warrant bold claims about free will and consciousness of the sort he examines in this book.

Introduction
Occurrent and standing intentions
Proximal and distal intentions and intentional action
Decisions
Preview
Conscious intentions and decisions
What is the question?
A thin reading of "conscious intention"
Questions answered : functional roles and folk theories
Conscious decisions
Neuroscience and causes of action
Libet's studies : data, inferences, and problems
A test : reaction times
Neuroscience and free will
Action initiation
More on vetoing
Free will and the liberty of indifference
Intentional actions and the alleged illusion of conscious wiii
Wegner on the iIllusion of conscious wil
Hypothesis H and table turning
More on ideomotor action
Conscious and nonconscious proximal intentions
Wegner on free will and the magical self
Proximal intentions and awareness reports
A recent study
Motor intentions and actions
Accuracy
The power of conscious will
Proximal decisions and an imaginary experiment
Implementation intentions : some findings
Implementation intentions and decisions : causal issues
Epiphenomenalism, proximal intentions, and hypothetical empirical discoveries
Free will and hypothetical empirical discoveries.

Tthere Is Weighty Evidence Of The Existence Of Effective Conscious Intentions Or The Power Of Conscious Will. Mele Examines The Accuracy Of Subjects' Reports About When They First Became Aware Of Decisions Or Intentions In Laboratory Settings And Develops Some Implications Of Warranted Skepticism About The Accuracy Of These Reports. In Addition, He Explores Such Questions As Whether We Must Be Conscious Of All Of Our Intentions And Why Scientists Disagree About This. From Publisher Description. Introduction -- Conscious Intentions And Decisions -- Neuroscience And Causes Of Action -- Neuroscience And Free Will -- Intentional Actions And The Alleged Illusion Of Conscious Will -- Proximal Intentions And Awareness Reports -- The Power Of Conscious Will -- Conclusion. Alfred R. Mele. Includes Bibliographical References (p. 163-171) And Index.

ix, 178 p. ; 22 cm
Includes bibliographical references (p. 163-171) and index
Introduction -- Conscious intentions and decisions -- Neuroscience and causes of action -- Neuroscience and free will -- Intentional actions and the alleged illusion of conscious will -- Proximal intentions and awareness reports -- The power of conscious will -- Conclusion

Do your intentions have no effect on your actions? Is free will an illusion? Some scientists say yes. Alfred Mele shows that these claims are not justified by the data and that there is weighty evidence of the existence of effective conscious intentions or the power of conscious will

2024-07-01