This volume assembles supporters and critics of situated cognition research to evaluate the intricacies, prerequisites, possibilities, and scope of a 4E methodology. The contributions are divided into three categories. The first category entails papers dealing with a 4E methodology from the perspective of epistemology and philosophy of science. It discusses whether to support explanatory pluralism or explanatory unification and focuses on possible compromises between ecological psychology and enactivism. The second category addresses ontological questions regarding the synchronic and diachronic constitution of cognitive phenomena, the localization of cognitive processes, and the theoretical issue of mutual manipulability. The third category analyzes how the theoretical and practical commitments of 4E approaches lead to empirically supported investigations of different phenomena, such as research on affordances and (chronic) pain. The book renews attention to the possible adverse consequences coming along with methodical fragmentation, as found among 4E positions. It provides an overdue first step towards a systematic and positive answer to methodological concerns in situated cognition research. Without this and further steps in the future, the growth of 4E ́s significance for the scientific study of the mind might stall or even decrease. With such steps, situated cognition research could realize its frequently highlighted but so far not comprehensively accessed potential to change radically the modalities of how cognitive phenomena are studied. This volume is of interest to scholars of the philosophy of mind.

lgli/Mark-Oliver Casper-Giuseppe Flavio Artese (eds) Situated Cognition Research-Methodological Foundations (Springer 2023).pdf

lgrsnf/Mark-Oliver Casper-Giuseppe Flavio Artese (eds) Situated Cognition Research-Methodological Foundations (Springer 2023).pdf

Casper, Mark-Oliver; Artese, Giuseppe Flavio

Springer Nature Switzerland AG

Studies in Brain and Mind, 2023

Springer Nature, Cham, 2023

Switzerland, Switzerland

producers:
Adobe PDF Library 10.0.1

Contents 6
Chapter 1: Introduction 8
1.1 The Quest for a Methodological Grounding 8
1.2 Method(ologi)cal Criticism 9
1.3 Sketch of Current Method(olog)ical Approaches and Resources 12
1.4 Methodological Preliminaries and the Contributions of this Volume 14
References 18
Part I: Philosophy of Science 22
Chapter 2: A Methodological Problem of Choice for 4E Research 23
2.1 Introduction 23
2.2 In Need for a Methodology 25
2.3 The Problem of Choice 27
2.3.1 Explanatory Unification 28
2.3.2 Explanatory Pluralism 31
2.4 Explanation Types in 4E Research 34
2.5 A Spectrum of Integration 36
2.5.1 Relation of Conditions and Stances 41
2.5.2 Example of Cross-Explanatory Integration 41
2.6 Where to Be in the Spectrum of Integration 44
2.7 Conclusion 45
References 46
Chapter 3: A Professional Guide to Explanation. Commentary on “A Methodological Problem of Choice for 4E Research” 50
References 55
Chapter 4: Explanatory Diversity and Embodied Cognitive Science: Reflexivity Motivates Pluralism 56
4.1 Introduction 56
4.2 The Philosophical Problem of Explanatory Diversity 58
4.2.1 Explanatory Diversity in Embodied Cognitive Science 60
4.3 Explanation and Pluralism(s) 61
4.3.1 Problems with Integrationist and Isolationist Pluralisms 63
4.3.2 Pluralism of Explanatory Styles 64
4.4 Reflexivity, Mind, and Embodiment 65
4.4.1 Reflexivity? 66
4.4.2 Reflexivity in the Enactive Tradition 67
4.4.3 Situated Reflexivity 69
4.5 From a Situated Reflexive Stance on Explanatory Diversity to Pluralism of Explanatory Styles 72
References 77
Chapter 5: Commentary on “Explanatory Diversity and Embodied Cognitive Science: Reflexivity Motivates Pluralism” 82
5.1 The Problem of Bypassing the Question 83
5.2 The Problem of a 4E Precondition 84
5.3 The Problem of a Small Vicious Circle 85
5.4 The Incorporation Problem 86
References 86
Chapter 6: Ecological Psychology, Enaction, and the Quest for an Embodied and Situated Cognitive Science 87
6.1 Towards an Embodied and Situated Cognitive Science 87
6.1.1 Where Do We Come From? 88
6.1.1.1 Ecological Psychology 88
6.1.1.2 Enaction 90
6.1.2 Where Are We Now? 92
6.1.3 What Do We Need? 94
6.2 Enaction: Philosophy of Nature or Research Program? 95
6.3 Ecological Psychology: A Philosophical and Scientific Framework 98
6.3.1 Ecological Psychology as a Philosophy of Nature 99
6.3.2 Ecological Psychology as a Research Program and Scientific Framework 100
6.4 Conclusion: Following the Ecological Lead 102
References 103
Chapter 7: Normativity and the Methodology of 4E Cognition: Taking Stock and Going Forward 107
7.1 Introduction 107
7.2 Three Claims on Normativity and Cognition 109
7.3 Normativity as Constitutive of Cognition: Ontological and Semantic Ascents 111
7.4 Folk Psychology and the Normativity of Daily Intentional Concepts 115
7.5 Beyond Neuroscience as a Conveyor of Confirmations for 4E Cognition 117
7.6 Neuroscience without Folk Psychology, Folk Psychology Without Literalism 122
7.7 Conclusion 126
References 127
Part II: Ontology of the Mind 131
Chapter 8: Extended Cognition and the Search for the Mark of Constitution – A Promising Strategy? 132
8.1 Introduction 132
8.2 Extended Cognition, Constitution & Criteria of Adequacy 133
8.3 Property-Based Constitution 136
8.4 Diachronic Constitution 138
8.5 Mechanistic Constitution 140
8.6 Conclusion 147
References 148
Chapter 9: Commentary on “Extended Cognition and the Search for the Mark of Constitution – A Promising Strategy?” 150
9.1 What Is Diachronic Constitution? 152
9.2 Diachronic Constitution and the Co-location Principle 154
References 156
Chapter 10: Dissolving the Causal-Constitution Fallacy: Diachronic Constitution and the Metaphysics of Extended Cognition 157
10.1 Introduction 158
10.2 Preliminary Remarks on Constitution and Causation 160
10.3 Two Kinds of Constitution 161
10.3.1 Material Constitution 162
10.3.2 Diachronic Constitution 162
10.4 Dissolving the Causal-Constitution Fallacy 165
10.5 Saving the Causal-Constitution Distinction 168
10.6 Concluding Remarks 173
References 173
Chapter 11: Why Diachronic Constitution Won’t Help. Commentary on “Dissolving the Causal-Constitution Fallacy” 176
11.1 Introduction 176
11.2 The CC-Fallacy and Diachronic Constitution 177
11.3 Mechanistic Constitution 179
References 180
Chapter 12: Predictive Processing and Extended Consciousness: Why the Machinery of Consciousness Is (Probably) Still in the Head and the DEUTS Argument Won’t Let It Leak Outside 182
12.1 Introduction 183
12.2 Predictive Processing and the Free-Energy Principle: A Quick Introduction 184
12.3 The DEUTS Argument, Twenty(Ish) Years Later 187
12.3.1 The First Step: Dynamical Entanglement 187
12.3.2 Dynamical Entanglement and Predictive Processing 188
12.3.3 The Second Step: Unique Temporal Signature 189
12.3.4 Unique Temporal Signature and Predictive Processing 191
12.4 Extended Consciousness in Predictive Processing: Three Problems 192
12.4.1 Cultural Practices Do Not Seem to Support Consciousness Vehicle Externalism 192
12.4.2 The Markov Blankets of the Conscious Mind 196
12.4.3 DEUTS and the Phenomenal Bloat 199
12.5 Conclusion 203
References 204
Chapter 13: Commentary on “Predictive Processing and Extended Consciousness” 210
13.1 Sensorimotor Enactivism and Predictive Processing 211
13.2 Cultural Practices and the Constitution of Phenomenal Experience 212
13.3 The Threat of Conscious Bloat 214
References 216
Chapter 14: Plural Methods for Plural Ontologies: A Case Study from the Life Sciences 218
14.1 Introduction 219
14.2 Mechanistic and Dynamical Explanations 222
14.2.1 Mechanistic Explanations 222
14.2.2 Dynamical Explanations 225
14.3 A Case Study 230
14.3.1 Mechanistic Explanation of Orientation in Bird Flocking 231
14.3.2 Dynamical Explanation of Velocity in Bird Flocking 232
14.4 Ontological Pluralism 234
14.5 Conclusion 236
References 236
Part III: Applications 240
Chapter 15: Chronic Pain, Enactivism, & the Challenges of Integration 241
15.1 Introduction 241
15.2 The Philosophy of Chronic Pain 243
15.2.1 Chronic Pain: Definition & Classification 243
15.2.2 A Brief History of Pain Theories 245
15.2.3 Neuro-Centrism 246
15.2.4 The Biopsychosocial Model 249
15.2.5 Five Facets of Integration 252
15.3 An Enactive Approach to Chronic Pain: Revisiting the Five Challenges of Integration 254
15.3.1 Main Pillars of Enactivism 254
15.3.2 Minimal Ontological Assumptions 255
15.3.3 Application to Chronic Pain 260
15.3.4 Conceptual, Explanatory, Methodological, & Therapeutic Challenges 264
15.4 Conclusion 268
References 269
Chapter 16: Affordances, the Social Environment, and the Notion of Field: State of the Debate and Methodological Insights 277
16.1 Introduction 278
16.2 Gibson’s Direct Realism and the Role Assigned to Language and Socio-cultural Practices 280
16.3 Neo-Gibsonian Interpretations of the Role of Sociality and Cultural Practices 283
16.4 The Organism-Environment Mutuality and the Social Context: Is a Reconceptualization Necessary? 285
16.5 Empirical Evidence and Further Challenges 287
16.6 The Value of Phenomenological Analyses and the Concept of Solicitation in the Study of Perception-Action Cycles 290
16.7 The Notion of Field: A Brief History and Its Implications 293
16.8 Gurwitsch’s Field of Consciousness and Its Methodological Implications: A Phenomenologically-Oriented Proposal 296
16.9 Conclusion 301
References 302
Index 306

This volume assembles supporters and critics of situated cognition research to evaluate the intricacies, prerequisites, possibilities, and scope of a 4E methodology. The contributions are divided into three categories. The first category entails papers dealing with a 4E methodology from the perspective of epistemology and philosophy of science. It discusses whether to support explanatory pluralism or explanatory unification and focuses on possible compromises between ecological psychology and enactivism. The second category addresses ontological questions regarding the synchronic and diachronic constitution of cognitive phenomena, the localization of cognitive processes, and the theoretical issue of mutual manipulability. The third category analyzes how the theoretical and practical commitments of 4E approaches lead to empirically supported investigations of different phenomena, such as research on affordances and (chronic) pain. The book renews attention to the possible adverse consequences coming along with methodical fragmentation, as found among 4E positions. It provides an overdue first step towards a systematic and positive answer to methodological concerns in situated cognition research. Without this and further steps in the future, the growth of 4E ́s significance for the scientific study of the mind might stall or even decrease. With such steps, situated cognition research could realize its frequently highlighted but so far not comprehensively accessed potential to change radically the modalities of how cognitive phenomena are studied. This volume is of interest to scholars of the philosophy of mind.
Erscheinungsdatum: 27.09.2023

2023-12-20