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lgli/约翰·梅纳德·史密斯 - 演化与博弈论 (西方经济社会思想名著译丛) (2008, cj5).epub
演化与博弈论 (西方经济社会思想名著译丛) 🔍
（英）约翰·梅纳德·史密斯著，潘香阳译 cj5, Xi fang jing ji she hui si xiang ming zhu yi cong, Di 1 ban, Shanghai, 2008
中文 [zh] · EPUB · 2.4MB · 2008 · 📕 小说类图书 · 🚀/duxiu/lgli/zlib · Save
描述
Professor John Maynard Smith has written an account of a new way of thinking about evolution which has been developed in the last ten years. The theory of games, first developed to analyse economic behaviour, is modified so that it can be applied to evolving populations. John Maynard Smith's concept of an evolutionarily stable strategy is relevant whenever the best thing for an animal or plant to do depends on what others are doing. The theory leads to testable predictions about the evolution of behaviour, of sex and genetic systems, and of growth and life history patterns. This book contains the first full account of the theory, and of the data relevant to it.
The account is aimed an senior undergraduate and graduate students, teachers and research workers in animal behaviour, population genetics and evolutionary biology. the book will also be of interest to mathematicians and game theorists. the mathematics has been largely confined to appendices so that the main text may be easily followed by biologists.
By applying game theory to the problems of population biology, the author has succeeded in inventing new and interesting ways of looking at populations and has developed a theory leading to testable predictions.
备用文件名
zlib/no-category/约翰·梅纳德·史密斯/演化与博弈论 (西方经济社会思想名著译丛)_18417943.epub
备选标题
演化与博弈论 = Evolution and the theory of games
备选标题
evolution and game theory
备选作者
(YING )YUE HAN MEI NA DE SHI MI SI PAN XIANG YANG YI
备选作者
Smith, John Maynard
备选作者
John Maynard Smith
备选作者
史密斯 J. M
备用出版商
Cambridge University Press (Virtual Publishing)
备用出版商
Fudan University Press Pub. Date :2008-10-01
备用出版商
上海:复旦大学出版社
备用版本
United Kingdom and Ireland, United Kingdom
备用版本
Cambridge, New York, England, 1982
备用版本
China, People's Republic, China
备用版本
Repr, Cambridge, 1985
备用版本
1, PS, 1982
备用版本
1, 1991
元数据中的注释
Bibliography: p. [205]-213.
Includes indexes.
元数据中的注释
Bookmarks: p1 (p1): 译丛总序
p2 (p1): 前言
p3 (p1): 第一章 导论
p4 (p10): 第二章 基本模型
p4-1 (p12): 一、鹰鸽博弈
p4-2 (p21): 二、对假设条件的分析
p4-3 (p25): 三、一个拓展模型——“全面树敌”
p5 (p29): 第三章 消耗战
p6 (p41): 第四章 遗传博弈模型
p6-1 (p42): 一、两倍体遗传的两策略博弈模型
p6-2 (p44): 二、有性生殖的表现型
p6-3 (p48): 三、异配生殖的演化问题
p7 (p55): 第五章 ESS策略
p8 (p69): 第六章 混合策略Ⅰ——对机制的分类
p9 (p82): 第七章 混合策略——案例
p9-1 (p82): 一、性别比
p9-2 (p84): 二、雀群中的地位
p9-3 (p88): 三、二态的雄性
p9-4 (p92): 四、理想自由分布
p9-5 (p94): 五、在一致不变的环境中的种群散布
p10 (p96): 第八章 非对称博弈Ⅰ——所有权
p11 (p110): 第九章 非对称博弈Ⅱ——分类及例证
p12 (p128): 第十章 非对称博弈Ⅲ——性别博弈和代际博弈
p12-1 (p128): 一、一些理论上的考虑
p12-2 (p131): 二、双亲抚育
p12-3 (p135): 三、循环动态博弈
p12-4 (p137): 四、性选择
p12-5 (p143): 五、具有交替行动的博弈
p13 (p146): 第十一章 生存史策略和体型博弈
p14 (p153): 第十二章 诚实、议价和承诺
p14-1 (p155): 一、动物竞争中的信息传播
p14-2 (p157): 二、炫耀性现象
p14-3 (p158): 三、议价、领地和交易
p14-4 (p168): 四、承诺
p15 (p174): 第十三章 合作的演化
p16 (p181): 第十四章 后记
p17 (p187): 附录
p17-1 (p187): 一、博弈论的矩阵表达形式
p17-2 (p188): 二、有两个纯策略的博弈总是具有一个ESS
p17-3 (p189): 三、Bishop-Canning定理
p17-4 (p190): 四、动态性和稳定性
p17-5 (p196): 五、报复
p17-6 (p199): 六、具有亲缘关系的个体之间的博弈
p17-7 (p202): 七、具有随机回报的消耗战
p17-8 (p205): 八、由一个或多个连续型变量定义的博弈的策略集合的ESS
p17-9 (p206): 九、从递归方程组中求解博弈的ESS
p17-10 (p208): 十、具有循环动态的非对称博弈
p17-11 (p210): 十一、重复博弈的囚徒困境
p18 (p213): 主要术语解释
p19 (p215): 参考文献
p20 (p230): 主题索引
备用描述
Professor John Maynard Smith has written an account of a new way of thinking about evolution which has been developed in the last ten years. The theory of games, first developed to analyse economic behaviour, is modified so that it can be applied to evolving populations. John Maynard Smith's concept of an evolutionarily stable strategy is relevant whenever the best thing for an animal or plant to do depends on what others are doing. The theory leads to testable predictions about the evolution of behaviour, of sex and genetic systems, and of growth and life history patterns. This book contains the first full account of the theory, and of the data relevant to it. The account is aimed at senior undergraduate and graduate students, teachers and research workers in animal behaviour, population genetics and evolutionary biology. The book will also be of interest to mathematicians and game theorists; the mathematics has been largely confined to appendixes so that the main text may be easily followed by biologists.
备用描述
In this 1982 book, the theory of games, first developed to analyse economic behaviour, is modified so that it can be applied to evolving populations. John Maynard Smith's concept of an evolutionarily stable strategy is relevant whenever the best thing for an animal or plant to do depends on what others are doing. The theory leads to testable predictions about the evolution of behaviour, of sex and genetic systems, and of growth and life history patterns. This book contains a full account of the theory, and of the data relevant to it. The account is aimed at senior undergraduate and graduate students, teachers and research workers in animal behaviour, population genetics and evolutionary biology. The book will also be of interest to mathematicians and game theorists; the mathematics has been largely confined to appendixes so that the main text may be easily followed by biologists
备用描述
In this 1982 book, the theory of games is modified so that it can be applied to evolving populations. Containing a full account of the theory, it leads to testable predictions about the evolution of behaviour, of sex and genetic systems, and of growth and life history patterns.
备用描述
本书把博弈论的思想纳入到生物演化的分析中, 揭示了动物群体行为变化的动力学机制
开源日期
2021-12-20
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